Encouraging to see the focus shift from waiting on one party to building durable civic capacity across the movement. The crucial test will be governance: transparent finance, accountable leadership, genuine autonomy for member groups and room for disagreement. If YES2030 embeds those principles from the start, it could begin building the civic infrastructure that statehood would require.
This is precisely the gap I am describing. A plebiscitary election might establish a political mandate, but it would not itself transfer authority or secure recognition. Invoking the Claim of Right does not explain that mechanism. “Defy the British state” names the confrontation; it does not explain how it would be won. Who exercises authority the following day, how do Scotland’s institutions continue to function, and why do other states recognise the result?
The opening historical claim is also simply false. Montenegro and South Sudan both became independent following referendums. The UN records both cases.
You are arguing against a proposal I have not made. I have not suggested reviving a referendum. The Supreme Court established that Holyrood cannot legislate for one under the present settlement, and my argument begins from that closure.
Scotland should build undeniable institutional competence, use devolved powers to their limits, and publicly identify every further power required and every Westminster refusal. That creates a record of demonstrated capacity on one side and sustained constitutional denial on the other.
Simply declaring defiance does not do the work required to turn democratic intent into effective statehood.
I do not disagree that repeatedly asking for a Section 30 order is not a strategy, nor am I defending the SNP’s record.
But you are collapsing two distinct questions. One is how Scotland secures and asserts democratic authority to leave. The other is whether Scotland possesses the institutional capacity to make that decision effective. A serious independence movement must answer both.
Institutional preparation would not itself deliver independence, and I have never claimed it would. It would make the transition credible, reduce the opportunities for administrative failure or obstruction, and remove one of the principal arguments against acting.
Once that preparation existed, the political task would remain: securing a clear mandate and making the cost of refusing Scottish democratic consent greater than the cost of recognising it.
A paper is not independence. Neither, however, is anger, another declaration or another manifesto promise unsupported by the capacity to carry it through. Desire and fruition are very different concepts.
There is another misconception here. A Section 30 order is not simply Westminster granting a referendum. It is a mechanism for altering the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. The 2013 order used that mechanism to permit the 2014 referendum, which is why the two have become conflated.
Nor can the SNP guarantee such an order in an election manifesto. It requires approval at both Westminster and Holyrood. They can promise to request one, which is precisely the exhausted cycle you are criticising.
That is why the argument must distinguish between the democratic mandate, the mechanism through which it becomes effective, and the institutional capacity to implement the result. None of those can substitute for the others.
I am not according Westminster a veto. I am acknowledging the power it currently exercises. Those are not the same thing.
The people of Scotland may be the source of democratic legitimacy, but that does not make the existing constitution and state machinery disappear. Popular sovereignty tells us who ought to decide. It does not, by itself, transfer legal authority, implement that decision or secure international recognition.
My argument is about changing the balance of power: building institutional capacity and securing a clear mandate until continued refusal becomes politically harder than agreement.
Recognising an obstacle is not legitimising it. Declaring that it has “no place” does not overcome it.
"Vision: what a better nation looks like in all key areas"
Do we really need yet another 'vision'? The trouble with visions is that everybody has one! Ask every person in Scotland for theirs and you'll get around 5.4m unique ones in response.
Visions don't increase support for Independence. On the contrary they create division. Efforts should be concentrated on HOW we exercise our right of self-determination and ultimately progress once more to independent statehood.
"Strengthen support for independence up to and beyond 55%"
We should be careful about setting thresholds for 'support'. How do you measure it? If you propose opinion polls as the barometer, which one(s)? And over what period of time?
I think that you would be creating a hostage to fortune by setting any kind of bar.
Far better to a) establish a practical path to full self-government and then b) run a campaign on the merits of nation statehood (running your own affairs according your own priorities and values) versus the demerits of union/annexation (letting an unrepresentative foreign parliament make decisions for you).
You are quite wrong and making lots of assumptions. Where did we mention SNP? We are very serious about getting Scotland independent as quickly as possible. Salvo and Liberation are doing great work but it could take 10 years and even if it takes less than that, we still need a campaign to show the people of Scotland that the intellect, preparation and thinking are being done and that they can have the confidence to vote for Independence when the time comes. Sara Salyers has said that Salvo cannot do it all. We must work together and take back our sovereignty.
Encouraging to see the focus shift from waiting on one party to building durable civic capacity across the movement. The crucial test will be governance: transparent finance, accountable leadership, genuine autonomy for member groups and room for disagreement. If YES2030 embeds those principles from the start, it could begin building the civic infrastructure that statehood would require.
This is precisely the gap I am describing. A plebiscitary election might establish a political mandate, but it would not itself transfer authority or secure recognition. Invoking the Claim of Right does not explain that mechanism. “Defy the British state” names the confrontation; it does not explain how it would be won. Who exercises authority the following day, how do Scotland’s institutions continue to function, and why do other states recognise the result?
The opening historical claim is also simply false. Montenegro and South Sudan both became independent following referendums. The UN records both cases.
You are arguing against a proposal I have not made. I have not suggested reviving a referendum. The Supreme Court established that Holyrood cannot legislate for one under the present settlement, and my argument begins from that closure.
Scotland should build undeniable institutional competence, use devolved powers to their limits, and publicly identify every further power required and every Westminster refusal. That creates a record of demonstrated capacity on one side and sustained constitutional denial on the other.
Simply declaring defiance does not do the work required to turn democratic intent into effective statehood.
Who is? Or are you advocating for a more urgent action without these institutions in place?
I do not disagree that repeatedly asking for a Section 30 order is not a strategy, nor am I defending the SNP’s record.
But you are collapsing two distinct questions. One is how Scotland secures and asserts democratic authority to leave. The other is whether Scotland possesses the institutional capacity to make that decision effective. A serious independence movement must answer both.
Institutional preparation would not itself deliver independence, and I have never claimed it would. It would make the transition credible, reduce the opportunities for administrative failure or obstruction, and remove one of the principal arguments against acting.
Once that preparation existed, the political task would remain: securing a clear mandate and making the cost of refusing Scottish democratic consent greater than the cost of recognising it.
A paper is not independence. Neither, however, is anger, another declaration or another manifesto promise unsupported by the capacity to carry it through. Desire and fruition are very different concepts.
There is another misconception here. A Section 30 order is not simply Westminster granting a referendum. It is a mechanism for altering the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. The 2013 order used that mechanism to permit the 2014 referendum, which is why the two have become conflated.
Nor can the SNP guarantee such an order in an election manifesto. It requires approval at both Westminster and Holyrood. They can promise to request one, which is precisely the exhausted cycle you are criticising.
That is why the argument must distinguish between the democratic mandate, the mechanism through which it becomes effective, and the institutional capacity to implement the result. None of those can substitute for the others.
I am not according Westminster a veto. I am acknowledging the power it currently exercises. Those are not the same thing.
The people of Scotland may be the source of democratic legitimacy, but that does not make the existing constitution and state machinery disappear. Popular sovereignty tells us who ought to decide. It does not, by itself, transfer legal authority, implement that decision or secure international recognition.
My argument is about changing the balance of power: building institutional capacity and securing a clear mandate until continued refusal becomes politically harder than agreement.
Recognising an obstacle is not legitimising it. Declaring that it has “no place” does not overcome it.
"A plebiscitary election might establish a political mandate, but it would not itself transfer authority or secure recognition."
An electoral event could, as you agree, establish the political legitimacy.
We assert that the people of Scotland are sovereign.
That is non negotiable.
That is our ancient right bequeathed to us and preserved 'for all time' in our Scots constitution.
We have the authority and choose what instruction to legitimately give to our parliament.
And to the final securing recognition part- that begs the question: recognition from who?
If you mean the international community then you know that is being handled by representations from Liberation to the UN.
If you mean from the Scottish people, well we have recognised what we intend to do by voting for it in an electoral event.
If you mean the rump of the UK state, then I say to you that they have no say.
They can accept it, or huff and puff!
We are Sovereign, they are foreign and have no legitimate input.
I expect you will have been following the cases at the UN C24 like e.g. French Polynesia and New Caledonia.
The UN is absolutely clear that the colonising state has no legitimate influence in the pre separation deliberations.
It is for us to arrange and for the UK to accept the result that we decide.
A couple of thoughts:
"Vision: what a better nation looks like in all key areas"
Do we really need yet another 'vision'? The trouble with visions is that everybody has one! Ask every person in Scotland for theirs and you'll get around 5.4m unique ones in response.
Visions don't increase support for Independence. On the contrary they create division. Efforts should be concentrated on HOW we exercise our right of self-determination and ultimately progress once more to independent statehood.
"Strengthen support for independence up to and beyond 55%"
We should be careful about setting thresholds for 'support'. How do you measure it? If you propose opinion polls as the barometer, which one(s)? And over what period of time?
I think that you would be creating a hostage to fortune by setting any kind of bar.
Far better to a) establish a practical path to full self-government and then b) run a campaign on the merits of nation statehood (running your own affairs according your own priorities and values) versus the demerits of union/annexation (letting an unrepresentative foreign parliament make decisions for you).
You are quite wrong and making lots of assumptions. Where did we mention SNP? We are very serious about getting Scotland independent as quickly as possible. Salvo and Liberation are doing great work but it could take 10 years and even if it takes less than that, we still need a campaign to show the people of Scotland that the intellect, preparation and thinking are being done and that they can have the confidence to vote for Independence when the time comes. Sara Salyers has said that Salvo cannot do it all. We must work together and take back our sovereignty.