NOTE. The paper below is described as a Draft. The reason is that old certainties are being demolished by the turbulence now evident in world political and economic life. Two wars, in Ukraine and Iran, are creating new geopolitical situations with profound potential effect on the positions of the major powers, the United States and China, and among those that the Prime Minister of Canada has described as the middle powers. No similar sage has produced guidance for small powers in how they might navigate in very troubled international waters.
For us in Europe the answer to the important question “Will Trump leave a legacy in NATO” will not be known until after the US 2028 election. The view of The Economist is that NATO and US-European relations will not go back to how things were. But that is an opinion. At present we do not know what the reality will be. Perhaps there will be a Trump legacy and on security the European members of NATO will assume more responsibility on cost and military responsibility.
There is also within Europe the possibility of instability both in the EU and NATO from the decisions that will be made by electors in France, Germany and Italy.
The point of making the policy below a Draft, is that between now, 2026 and 2029-30, we can anticipate the new forces, and elections, eluded to will require some parts to be re-drafted.
Jim Sillars
Yes United
Draft
Scottish Foreign Policy
Guiding principles of Scottish foreign policy.
There will be a Scottish Foreign Affairs and Trade Department. Promotion of trade will be an integral part of the work embassies. It is sensible, for a small nation with limited resources to combine involvement with foreign countries with trade activity.
An independent Scotland’s foreign policy will be based on the realities that dictate inter-state relationships. These are: geography, size (economic and physical), state interests, spheres of influence, security. Scottish state interests will be paramount in policy decisions, but these will not be interpretated as to exclude the concept of enlightened state interests when shaping policy, especially when engaging with allies and others in security and trade negotiations.
Based on those factors as applied to Scotland, certain decisions about relationships with others are inescapable, both for economic and security reasons. That means engaging with others in mutually beneficial relations in our in the western hemisphere, staying out of political or military involvement in world regions where we have no strategic state interest.
As a small northern maritime European nation our first priority is to maintain good relations with our immediate UK and Irish neighbours in the British Isles, and with our Western and Central European neighbours in EFTA and the European Union. That is important for trade purposes, but also for our national security.
Both economic and political factors require us to have similar relations as a priority of foreign policy with the United States and Canada.
In other world regions it will be in our state interests for embassies to be located in the capitals of major powers, to ensure the Scottish government is well informed and has a deep understanding of the roles they play and the geopolitical forces the generate. Scottish understanding of the world outside of the European region, will enable us to play a constructive role in international relations and within international organisations, especially the United Nations. We shall seek to find and maintain a useful role within the Commonwealth.
As a small nation we shall need quickly to divest ourselves of the intervention mentality that was part and parcel of our make-up during the period of empire and the UK union. In certain parts of the world what a small Scottish state can do in state-to-state crisis, in regional conflicts, will be limited to humanitarian aid if such can be delivered.
Scotland will commit 0.7% of GDP to international aid. The aim will be twofold: to enhance educational opportunity for children and to empower women in the developing world.
Scotland will seek to play a useful role in the world’s affairs. There are times and circumstances when a small country, which threatens no one, can play a role in conflict resolution, or can be the location in which antagonists can meet in seeking a solution. For Scotland to play such a part in international issues will require the development of high quality diplomatic staff. Towards that end there will be created a Public Service Staff College to foster and promote leadership at the highest level within the foreign office. The College will also serve the Scottish Civil Service.
Early- stage development of policy
A Scottish government, in the early stages of independence, will concentrate on relations with our neighbouring states in Europe, the United States and Canada. At the same time the aim will be to build up the foreign and trade department staffed by diplomats, so that we are able to locate embassies in the first priority states, and later in key strategic states in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Americas.
National Security and NATO
Scotland’s geography makes us of strategic importance to others – the USA, and our European neighbours who form the North Atlantic Alliance. Our geography places us in their spheres of influence because Scotland, an unsinkable aircraft carrier in a key northern maritime location, places us in a vital role in that part of NATO’s security system designed to keep the Atlantic sea lanes open, by denying any adversary access to them from the North Sea.
The submarine base at Faslane is an integral part of NATO’s defensive system, and the question of whether it remains or is re-located as the home of a nuclear- armed submarines, will be a matter of discussion and negotiation between NATO, Scotland and England, both in the context of NATO security and in the text of the Scottish-English Treaty that will spell out the terms of separation. Inherent in that context is leverage in the hands of Scottish negotiators.
It is our declared position that independence should pose no threat in any way to the security of our European neighbours or to the strategic interests of the United States. It will therefore be a tenet of our nation’s foreign policy to remain an integral part of NATO, and to play a full part in that Alliance.
NATO is a political as well as a military alliance. Scotland’s position politically is that NATO should restrict its concerns and guidance of its military solely to the North Atlantic region of the original signatories and the most recent expansion within Europe. We recognise that the United States has interests in other regions of the world, but wish to emphasise that we see no reason why NATO European states should extend their collective responsibility under Article 5 to any other region of the world.
EUROPE
The key objective of European policy is to gain smooth access to the EU market, our closest and largest one, but also to keep open our flexibility to better enter markets that are growing in the Indo-Pacific region.
The European Union
In terms of security and trade, Scotland’s relationship with European states is of prime importance. Of equal importance is that in our dealings with European neighbours we are not seduced by diplomatic rhetoric, but by hard headed analysis based upon an assessment of Scottish state interests. No one is going to offer us a free lunch.
Independence means Scotland gains sovereignty. Entering alliances means there is a trade-off of sovereignty for the advantages the alliance offers. Sovereignty is not lost, because there remains the sovereign ability to withdraw from an alliance, which rarely happens.
That part of Europe that is the European Union, outside the matter of NATO, is important to Scotland economically as a huge market for our goods and services. A Scottish application for membership is unlikely to be turned down. The duration of negotiations, the terms of entry, and date of entry are important, but at present unknown. The EU is not a philanthropic body and will seek advantageous terms for its members, and Scotland will need to accept its institutions and common area policies as they stand today. The EU rules are not open to change by an applicant. The balance of power between the giant EU and a small nation will provide one side with more power in negotiations than the other.
The EU member states do not share sovereignty, they transfer a good part of it to the Union as set out in the Lisbon treaty. The EU Common Agricultural and Common Fisheries Policy will not be open for negotiations. The question of membership of the Euro as an immediate term of entry is unlikely to be demanded as Scotland, with a currency still in early stages of being tested, will not in the early years of independence meet the criteria for entry. A future commitment to joining the Euro is likely to be required. That will require a commitment to a substantial future transfer of sovereignty, as is the case with any state that has no control of its own currency.
It is not wise to commit post-independence (as it was not pre-independence) to say entering the EU is our only option. If Scotland signals that message, then we send our people naked into the negotiations. The EU is not our only option.
The European Economic Area
The EEA, built upon the 1994 treaty between EFTA states and the EU, and is therefore a tried and tested relationship. It offers a better outcome for Scotland than membership of the EU, both in terms of sovereignty trade-off and flexibility in trade with the rest of the world.
The EEA meets Scotland’s need for easy entry to the EU market as, in its essential, it extends the EU single market to Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, the three EFTA signatories to the EEA. Switzerland, an EFTA member, has its own agreement with the EU reflecting its own distinct needs.
EFTA states’ membership of the EEA and the EU single market means accepting the free movement of goods, services, people and capital, and the Schengen free-travel area. Articles 99 and 100 of the EEA treaty guarantee EFTA involvement in the development of EU policy on the single market.
Individual EFTA states can join in EU programmes. Norway, for example joins the EU in 11 programmes, including Erasmus; and in 32 other projects. Norway pays its share of the costs
The EEA does not involve EFTA members joining the EU customs union, thus providing them with the ability to make trade agreements with countries worldwide. EFTA has 31 free trade agreements with states outside of Europe. Among them are large growing economies in Asia including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and Korea. Canada is another. Scotland in EFTA will adhere to these automatically.
EFTA states membership of the EEA leaves them sovereign over currency, home affairs, foreign affairs, defence, energy, agriculture and their right over their home seas’ resources.
Being an EFTA state is not a barrier to seeking membership of the EU, as was illustrated in the Iceland referendum on that point in 2026. It will be noted that Iceland’s decision was not to join thus retaining its position in the internal market, without the major trade-off of sovereignty that EU membership would require.
The first step for Scotland will be to seek membership of EFTA, with which contact has been established for a number of years. From that position, nominated by EFTA for membership of the EEA as a member of EFTA, we can fairly anticipate acceptance by the UE member states. Scottish membership of EFTA and through it the EEA, threatens no vested interest in the EU, but simply adds a small state to its internal market.
Later stage development & budget
In the later stages of the first independent parliament it will be possible to locate embassies (and consulates) in other parts of the world outside Europe, USA and Canada. Talking Norway as a comparator this will take the whole number to 78 plus 3 consulates. Taking Ireland as a comparator in terms of a foreign affairs budget, by the end of the first parliament it will be in the region of £1.2 bn.